Alternative Strategies for Afghanistan:
The Dialogue We've Never Had

Canada's mission in Afghanistan has divided our country and clearly, Canadians are conflicted. Roughly 50% of those polled support our current military role; the other 50% calls for either immediate withdrawal or an end to the mission no later than February 2009. Do we have other options? Are there alternative approaches and strategies that Canada can pursue that would be more constructive -- and more reflective of Canadian values? A discussion of viable alternatives is long overdue.

I have been asked to speak about Canada's role in Afghanistan-and to particularly focus on, what I refer to as the dialogue that we have never had.

A Government's decision to go to war is perhaps the most important one that it will ever have to make. Yet, the decision by the Canadian Government to commit 2500 troops to a war fighting role in Afghanistan, was made with very little discussion, virtually no input from the Canadian public and passed by only 4 votes in the House of Commons.

Unfortunately, without an extensive debate and discussion of the complexities of the situation in Afghanistan, and how Canada, as a "middle power," might appropriately respond - we have instead had a rush to war. This has in turn led to an extreme polarization of public opinion, with roughly half of the Canadian public supporting our current role and the other half opposed to our involvement. The government insists that the low level of support for the mission is because they have not adequately explained it to Canadians--- if we had a better sense of the mission-then support would rise dramatically.

Unfortunately, the Government has done little or nothing to expand the discussion of our role in Afghanistan beyond the classic labeling - that you are either with us or against us - you either support our troops - or the implication is that you are a friend of the Taliban. This type of false dichotomy only serves to shut down any kind of enlightened discussion of what we are doing, how we are doing it, and what other options or alternatives might be considered.

So let's try to bridge that "with us or against us" rhetoric and look at some very important options that we should be discussing -- as parliament looks at whether or not to extend the Canadian mission past February of 2009.

Canadians want to do the right thing - but the government and the opposition parties have only presented us with two options - to remain in Afghanistan in a war fighting capacity under NATO command - or to withdraw-either immediately or in February 2009. Canadians feel uncomfortable with both of these options and many are wondering about whether or not there could be a middle ground - a way to, for example, concentrate on humanitarian relief or capacity building - rather than our overwhelming emphasis on a military role. The imbalance of our current priorities in Afghanistan is starkly contrasted by our spending-with only one of every $10 spent, going to development assistance.

I feel that the government, the opposition parties, and the media have all been remiss by not providing us with any viable options to consider and discuss. I would like to briefly highlight 3 alternative roles that Canada could consider playing - if we feel that we should remain in Afghanistan in some constructive capacity.

The three alternative suggestions are:
1. Adopt the Dutch model of engagement
2. Emphasize and facilitate diplomatic solutions
and
3. Coordinate the implementation of constructive plans to deal with the opium poppy debacle.

So let's take a quick look at each one:

1. We are constantly being told that there has to be security before development can take place -- and that is why we are pursuing this warfighting model. However the Dutch approach belies that mantra and we could well learn from their approach. The Dutch have 1400 troops that took over the Uruzgan province in southern Afghanistan a year and a half ago. That area, along with the Kandahar region where the Canadians are based, are both considered volatile strongholds of the Taliban insurgency-but the Dutch encountered a completely different response when they arrived and settled in.

After more than 400 patrols, establishing forward bases and building roads, bridges, schools and clinics - they have sustained one death and a handful of injuries (the last statistics of which I am aware) - a stark contrast to our 73 deaths and hundreds of injuries.

What makes the Dutch approach unique and so effective? The "Dutch philosophy" as it is called, is a strategy focused on supporting the local government. They talk with the Taliban instead of fighting them. The Dutch tread carefully, realizing how little understanding any foreigner has about the history, culture and traditions of this country. What do they do? Rather than sending convoys out to the farthest regions and asserting their presence (as the Canadians do - often precipitating gun battles) the Dutch move with extreme caution and set up far away from the villages. They then send in a delegation to see if the elders are willing to negotiate. Though initially suspicious and frightened, the elders have been willing to work with them. The Dutch then spread the word, throughout the region, that they want to come in without fighting -- and the strategy has worked. Listening to the radio frequencies used by the insurgents, the Dutch interpreters heard locals discussing the new type of foreigner that was replacing the U.S. troops. The locals were heard to say those Dutch aren't here to fight, they are here to talk. The Dutch talk to the elders, and, using provincial governors as the intermediary. They also talk to the Taliban.

The Dutch commanders say that if you are willing to talk -- it is surprising what results. But they also caution that it is very slow going; it can take months and months -and at all times- you have to show in everything that you do and say - that you are genuinely trying to understand their conflict.

The Canadian and American approach is quite different. They go into unstable areas and establish forward operating bases - often building them into fortresses with giant sandbags and razor wire. These bases are the launching point for their military operations.

The Dutch, on the other hand, build mud walled compounds that they call multi functional qalas - which is the Pashto name for house - these qalas are also designed with a traditional guest room for Afghan visitors. The soldiers, who live in these dwellings, are given designated areas for which they are responsible and they are expected to visit every household in their area (usually 12-30 sq kilometres) and monitor the needs of those residents.

An added feature of the Dutch approach is that not only do they help the local residents with the basics of survival - but they also try to serve as honest brokers for villagers whose relatives have been captured by coalition forces. As well, the Dutch forces also try to protect villagers from the actions of corrupt or undisiciplined Afghan soldiers and police.

The Dutch model works on a number of levels to make the area safer, in addition to working at a very personal level with the Afghan civilians.

What an inspirational and respectful model - particularly when compared with our aggressive approach.

2nd alternative: We need to engage in a new political dialogue. According to a report by the international crisis group-when Afghan citizens were polled, the same reasons were repeated over and over as to why they were increasingly opposing the government of Hamid Karzai. What are some of these factors? Corruption, abuses by the local and national security forces, the favouring of one group or tribe over another -- thus disenfranchising people from decision making and power structures. And resource quarrels-particularly over land and water.

What is so striking about these grievances is that they are fairly typical of what you would find in any conflict - and most important of all - these grievances are amenable to negotiation. Canada needs to redirect our emphasis to addressing these factors and working to build accommodation between the government and its people -otherwise- as the counterinsurgency war continues, many Afghans will transfer their allegiance from a government that has not lived up to their expectations - and turn instead to the very groups that we (and the other international forces) are fighting!

There are models for negotiation and conflict resolution in divided societies that are well suited to resolving these differences - a recent article in the Edmonton Journal titled "Mending A Torn Society" gave an excellent overview of how this process works.

Interestingly it is almost identical to the process that Canada used to bring about the International Ban on Landmines. We have shown leadership in the past in bringing together conflicting parties and forging consensus - we could certainly apply these skills and leadership in Afghanistan - if we so choose.

3rd alternative: Another major area that really needs a rethink -- and for which a fantastic alternative is available - is what I would call the "elephant in the middle of the room" - the issue that dominates everything -- but we pretend it isn't there - in Afghanistan, that elephant is the poppy fields.

Opium production is the key component of Afghanistan's economy. And every year since the fall of the Taliban, the crop yields have increased and increased - often doubling from one year to the next. But hundreds of thousands of farmers depend on opium poppies for their livelihood; the driving force behind the poppies is extreme poverty and opium is the surest source of income. Obviously the poppy eradication programme, as pursued by the U.S. and Britain, would be devastating to the local economy. Just in Khandahar province alone - where the Canadian military is operating - it is estimated that 160,000 people or 26,000 households rely on poppy production for their survival. Canada has been pushing the idea of alternative crops - however, for a number of reasons, it is not a realistic option. For example, wheat farmers had to plant 3 times the amount of land - but still received 1/3 less income.

Since poppies are fueling the insurgency - we have to do something - but what ? Is there a way of providing economic security to the Afghani people?

The Senlis Institute, an independent think tank based in the U.K., specializes in security and development issues. It has developed a remarkable blueprint for dealing with the opium production and it would provide a village based economic solution to the poppy crisis. Recognizing that poppy cultivation can be a constructive endeavor - and building on the tradition of strong, local village control systems - they are proposing the controlled cultivation of opium poppies for the village based production of codeine and morphine. Calling it a "village based poppy for medicine model" - they have developed a highly detailed plan to bring the illegal poppy cultivation under control - and in a sustainable manner. The key feature of their plan is to have the entire production process -from opium seed to the resulting medicinal tablets be controlled in the village - in conjunction with government and international N.G.O.s. Further, all economic profits from the medicinal sales would remain in the village - thus providing needed dollars for economic diversification. The Senlis Institute advocates that pilot projects be established for the next planting season, in various regions. This actual trial of the proposal would enable measurement of the economic effectiveness of this imaginative initiative - and provide an opportunity to refine the programme, if necessary.

Coincidentally, the International Narcotics Control Board, whose mandate is to ensure an adequate supply of morphine and codeine for medical and scientific purposes, cites that 80% of the world's population faces an acute shortage of these medicines. The Senlis proposal provides an extraordinary opportunity, not only diffuse the contentious poppy production dilemma - but also to provide a creative way for a post conflict society to diversify its economy. Further, it would allow Afghanistan to constructively participate in international trade, and at the same time, meet a global need for medicines.

So, if we combine or play around with combinations of the alternatives suggested above: